Three essays on public goods / Ekrem Ünal Zenginobuz.
xi, 109 p. : ill. ; 29 cm.
- Local subjects:
- Penn dissertations -- Economics.
Economics -- Penn dissertations.
- In the first essay we study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public good economy. A group of agents are engaged in a contest whereby a set of prizes are distributed according to relative position in the private good distribution. The extent of concern for prizes, and the spread between prize levels together effect an agent's willingness to contribute to the public good. Depending on the nature of prizes, i.e. whether higher private good consumption is rewarded or punished, the contest for relative position either exacerbates or ameliorates the free-riding problem. We analyze how concern for relative position effects the properties of equilibrium in our model. We also study the issue of designing optimal prize schemes to induce more efficient public good levels.
In the second essay we study two taxing schemes in a public good economy, and show that each allows unanimously approved increases in the public good level compared to the outcome at the noncooperative contribution equilibrium, which is taken as characterizing the no-government situation. Under both the proportional-taxing scheme (PTS), which divides the cost in proportion to endowments, and the equal-taxing scheme (ETS), which divides the cost of public good equally among agents, even the minimum of the most-preferred public good levels of agents leads to an outcome that is Pareto-superior to the noncooperative outcome.
In the third essay we consider a local public good model with a fixed number of communities, where agents partially benefit from the public good supplied in other communities. The public good level is determined efficiently within each community, but communities do not cooperate with respect to the externality created by partial spillover effects. We first study the impact of partial spillover effects on equilibrium for a given population distribution, and then consider their impact on the distribution of population when there is free mobility. We show for quasi-linear utilities that partial spillover effects may give rise to stable multi-community structures even with identical agents, whereas without spillover effects only the efficient grand community would be stable.
- Thesis (Ph.D. in Economics) -- University of Pennsylvania, 1996.
Includes bibliographical references.
- Local notes:
- University Microfilms order no.: 97-13034.
- University of Pennsylvania.
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