Free will : a philosophical reappraisal / Nicholas Rescher.

Rescher, Nicholas.
New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Publishers, c2009.
xiii, 173 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Free will and determinism.
The nature of free will
Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation
Free will requires the absence of thought-external determination over choices and decisions
Choice and decision are crucial
Doing and trying
Free action and agent causality
Modes of freedom
Metaphysical and moral freedom
Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially by compulsion
Intention and moral standing
Moral freedom of the will involves agent intent and motivation
Ramifications of freedom
Free will requires up-to-the-end revisability but this does not gainsay probabilistic predictability
Issues of revision and control
The counterfactual dimension : "could have done otherwise"
Problem cases : machines and lunatics
Free will as outside causality but compatible with it
Averting the zenonic fallacy of causal regression
Averting predetermination (contrasting predetermination with precedence determination)
The crucial contrast between events and eventuations
Choices and decisions as terminating eventuations
Free will stands outside the stream of natural causality
On freedom and causality
Free will excludes predetermination but not motive determinism
Motivational determinism vs. casual necessitation
Motivations and motives
Freedom from what? Certainly not from one's own motives and reasons : freedom demands motivational determination
Free will requires motivational determinism
Determination by one's autonomous motives is the crux of moral freedom
Compulsion vs. impulsion
Objections to motive determinism can be met
Freedom and motivation
Must an agent choose his motives for a decision to qualify (morally) as free?
Freedom does not require motivational self-construction
Does freedom require self-understanding?
On willing to will : does freedom require the will to be self-endorsing?
Does freedom require the approval of intellect and reason?
Does freedom require self-approved motives?
Buridan's ass : a random willfulness is not freedom
Compatibilism regained : what free will excludes is not agent determination but agent-bypassing nature determination
The explanation of free acts through agent determination
Freedom, responsibility, and "could have done otherwise"
Reasons and motives impel but do not compel
Compatibilism again
Mind-matter partnership
A two-sided coin
The issue of initiative
A pivotal duality
Mind-brain interaction works by coordination, not by causality
Does free will exist? Deliberations pro and con
On evidentiating free will
Is free will unscientific?
So does science counter-indicate free will?
Free-will naturalism and evolution
Includes bibliographical references (p. 165-169) and index.
9781412808743 (alk. paper)
141280874X (alk. paper)
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