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Incentives for pollution control : [electronic resource] regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante.

Author/Creator:
Foulon, Jérôme.
Other Title:
World Bank working papers.
Publication:
Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, [2000]
Series:
Policy research working papers ; 2291.
World Bank e-Library.
Policy research working papers
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource
Subjects:
Disclosure of information.
Environmental impact charges.
Environmental law.
Environmental policy.
Environmental protection.
Environmental responsibility.
Pollution -- Standards.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary:
Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control.
Notes:
"February 2000"--Cover.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31).
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Lanoie, Paul.
Laplante, Benoît, 1960-
World Bank.
World Bank. Development Research Group. Environment and Infrastructure.
Other format:
Print version: Foulon, Jérôme. Incentives for pollution control.
OCLC:
44434205
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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