Decentralization and accountability : [electronic resource] are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections? / Stuti Khemani.

Khemani, Stuti.
Other Title:
World Bank working papers.
Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economis, [2001]
Policy research working papers ; 2557.
World Bank e-Library.
Policy research working papers
Government document
1 online resource
Elections -- India.
Local elections -- India.
State governments -- India -- Elections.
Voting research -- India.
India -- Politics and government.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election.
"February 2001"--Cover.
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 17, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17).
Description based on print version record.
World Bank.
World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Other format:
Print version: Khemani, Stuti. Decentralization and accountability.
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
Location Notes Your Loan Policy
Description Status Barcode Your Loan Policy