Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : [electronic resource] evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic / by Robert Cull, Jana Matesova, and Mary Shirley.

Author/Creator:

Cull, Robert J.

Other Title:

World Bank working papers.

Publication:

Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and competition policy, [2001]

Series:

Policy research working papers ; 2568.
World Bank e-Library.
Policy research working papers

Format/Description:

Government document
Book
1 online resource

Subjects:

Corporate governance -- Czech Republic.
Privatization -- Law and legislation -- Czech Republic.

System Details:

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Summary:

Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization.

Notes:

"March 2001"--Cover.
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 16, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (p.31-33).
Description based on print version record.

Contributor:

Matesova, Jana.
Shirley, Mary M., 1945-
World Bank.
World Bank. Development Research Group. Regulation and Competition Policy.

Other format:

Print version: Cull, Robert J. Ownership structure and the temptation to loot.

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.

Online:

Connect to full text
http://hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017.12/1256197

Loading...