Franklin

Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : [electronic resource] evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic / by Robert Cull, Jana Matesova, and Mary Shirley.

Author/Creator:
Cull, Robert J.
Other Title:
World Bank working papers.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and competition policy, [2001]
Series:
Policy research working papers ; 2568.
World Bank e-Library.
Policy research working papers
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource
Subjects:
Corporate governance -- Czech Republic.
Privatization -- Law and legislation -- Czech Republic.
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary:
Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization.
Notes:
"March 2001"--Cover.
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 16, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (p.31-33).
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Matesova, Jana.
Shirley, Mary M., 1945-
World Bank.
World Bank. Development Research Group. Regulation and Competition Policy.
Other format:
Print version: Cull, Robert J. Ownership structure and the temptation to loot.
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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