LEADER 02327cam a22004097a 4500
006 m d
008 060821s2006 dcu ob i000 0 eng
a| (The World Bank)WBEL14510240
a| (The World Bank)14510240
a| DLC c| DLC
a| Walker, Eduardo.
a| Annuity markets in Chile : h| [electronic resource] b| competition, regulation - and myopia? / c| Eduardo Walker.
a| [Washington, D.C. : b| World Bank, c| 2006]
a| 1 online resource b|
a| Policy research working papers
a| Mode of access: World Wide Web.
a| Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/21/2006.
a| Includes bibliographical references.
a| Restricted for use by site license.
a| "The author studies annuity rates in Chile and relates them with industry competition. He finds (1) that annuity insurance companies paying higher broker commissions paid lower annuity rates; and (2) a structural break of the long-run elasticity of annuity rates to the risk-free rate in 2001. Moreover, this structural break coincided with the submission of a new draft pension law proposing greater transparency in annuity markets and a generalized drop in broker commissions. The high commissions charged in the 1990s were partly returned to annuitants as informal (and illegal) cash rebates. Myopic pensioners preferred cash rebates over present values. Thus, the legal threat caused the drop in broker commissions, reduced the illegal practice of cash rebates, increased competition by way of annuity rates, and raised the long-run elasticity to one. "--World Bank web site.
a| Also available in print.
a| Description based on print version record.
a| Annuities z| Chile.
a| World Bank.
a| World Bank.
a| World Bank working papers.
a| Print version: i| Walker, Eduardo. t| Annuity markets in Chile. d| [Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006]
a| Policy research working papers ; v| 3972.
a| World Bank e-Library.
u| http://hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017.12/1257565 z| Connect to full text
b| web h| -