Franklin

Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies: [electronic resource] A Conceptual Framework Jon Strand

Author/Creator:
Strand, Jon
Other Title:
World Bank working papers.
Publication:
Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2013
Series:
Policy research working papers.
World Bank e-Library.
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary:
While notoriously inefficient, fuel subsidies are widespread, and in many cases politically stable. This paper discusses and models various political economy aspects of fuel subsidies, focusing on gasoline and kerosene. Both economic and political are considered to explain differences in subsidies, with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. A political process is modeled whereby a promise of low fuel prices is used in democracies to attract voters, and in autocracies to mobilize support among key groups. Subsidies to fuels are viewed as either easier to observe, easier to commit to, easier to deliver, or better targeted at core groups, than other public goods or favors offered by rulers. Easier commitment and delivery than for regular public goods can explain the high prevalence of such policies in autocracies, and also in young democracies where the capacity to commit to or deliver complex public goods is not yet fully developed. The analysis provides a framework for empirical testing and verification.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Strand, Jon
World Bank.
Other format:
Print version: Strand, Jon Political Economy Aspects of Fuel Subsidies:.
Publisher Number:
10.1596/1813-9450-6392
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
Loading...
Location Notes Your Loan Policy
Description Status Barcode Your Loan Policy