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Protection for Free? [electronic resource] : The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff suspensions, Mishra, Prachi.

Author/Creator:
Mishra, Prachi.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 10/211.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 10/211
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (48 p.)
Local subjects:
Binary decision. (search)
Commercial Policy. (search)
Corporate sector. (search)
Correlation. (search)
Correlations. (search)
Econometrics. (search)
Economic models. (search)
Equation. (search)
Equations. (search)
Expenditure. (search)
Expenditure functions. (search)
Expenditure level. (search)
Expenditure levels. (search)
Expenditures. (search)
General. (search)
Import tariffs. (search)
Instrumental variable. (search)
Instrumental variables. (search)
Integrals. (search)
Logarithms. (search)
Mathematics. (search)
Measurement error. (search)
Prediction. (search)
Predictions. (search)
Probabilities. (search)
Probability. (search)
Probability model. (search)
Promotion. (search)
Protection. (search)
Random variable. (search)
Regression analysis. (search)
Regression equation. (search)
Sample selection. (search)
Sample size. (search)
Significance level. (search)
Standard error. (search)
Standard errors. (search)
Statistic. (search)
Statistical significance. (search)
Statistics. (search)
Survey. (search)
Tariff structures. (search)
Total expenditures. (search)
Trade Negotiations. (search)
Trade policy. (search)
United States. (search)
Summary:
This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Ludema, Rodney D.
Mayda, Anna Maria.
Mishra, Prachi.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1455205427:
9781455205424
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781455205424.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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