Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle [electronic resource] Le Borgne, Eric.
- Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
- IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 02/48.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 02/48
- Government document
1 online resource (39 p.)
- Local subjects:
- Asymmetric and Private Information.
Campaign finance reform.
Economic Models of Political Processes. -- Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation.
Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance.
- We investigate whether private information about citizens'' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in the former case can entry be revealing. We apply these results to Rogoff''s (1990) political budget cycle model: as interests are common, low-ability candidates are screened out at the entry stage, and so there is no signaling via fiscal policy. In a variant of Rogoff''s model where citizens differ in honesty, interests are conflicting, so the political budget cycle can persist.
- Description based on print version record.
- Le Borgne, Eric.
- Other format:
- Print Version:
- Publisher Number:
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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