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Fiscal Policy and the Predictability of Exchange Rate Collapse [electronic resource] Daniel, Betty C..

Author/Creator:
Daniel, Betty C.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997.
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (18 p.)
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 97/133.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 97/133
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Local subjects:
Bond. (search)
Bonds. (search)
Currency crises. (search)
Derivative. (search)
Exchange rate. (search)
Exchange rate crises. (search)
Exchange rate crisis. (search)
Exchange rate depreciation. (search)
Exchange rate mechanism. (search)
Exchange rate regime. (search)
Exchange rate regimes. (search)
Exchange rates. (search)
Exchange reserves. (search)
Fixed exchange rate. (search)
Fixed exchange rate regime. (search)
Fixed exchange rates. (search)
Flexible exchange rate. (search)
Floating exchange rate. (search)
Floating exchange rate regime. (search)
Foreign exchange. (search)
Foreign exchange market. (search)
Foreign exchange reserves. (search)
Government bond. (search)
Government bonds. (search)
Money market. (search)
Nominal interest rate. (search)
Present value. (search)
Private bonds. (search)
Spot exchange rate. (search)
Summary:
It is well known that the long-run viability of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes constraints on monetary policy. This paper shows that, in a model with forward-looking agents, short-run viability imposes a fiscal constraint. When policy change, which destroys long-run viability, also violates the fiscal constraint, collapse is instantaneous. Delayed predictable collapse requires satisfaction of the fiscal constraint.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Daniel, Betty C.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1451855451:
9781451855456
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451855456.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.