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Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard [electronic resource] : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? Becker, Törbjörn I..

Author/Creator:
Becker, Törbjörn I.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 01/92.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 01/92
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (41 p.)
Local subjects:
Asset Pricing.
Bearer bond.
Bond.
Bond contract.
Bond contracts.
Bond financing.
Bond flows.
Bond issuance.
Bond issue.
Bond issues.
Bond market.
Bond market access.
Bond markets.
Bond ratings.
Bond restructuring.
Bond yields.
Bondholders.
Bonds.
Brady bonds.
Cash flows.
Collective action clauses.
Convertible bonds.
Corporate bonds.
Dollar bonds.
Dual currency bonds.
Emerging market bond.
Emerging market bonds.
Emerging markets.
Eurobond.
Eurobonds.
Financial institutions.
Financial law.
Financial market.
Financial markets.
Financial stability.
Financial system.
Fixed rate bonds.
Foreign bonds.
Global bonds.
Individual bond.
Individual bondholders.
International banks.
International bond.
International bond issues.
International bond markets.
International bonds.
International capital.
International capital markets.
International finance.
International financial architecture.
International Financial Markets.
International law.
International Lending and Debt Problems.
Law.
Market bond.
Moral hazard.
Outstanding bonds.
Rate bonds.
Samurai bonds.
Sovereign bond.
Sovereign bonds.
Supply of bonds.
Valuation of bonds.
Yankee bonds.
Yields on bonds.
Argentina.
Brazil.
Ecuador.
Korea, Republic of.
Luxembourg.
Mexico.
Pakistan.
Philippines.
Turkey.
Ukraine.
United States.
Summary:
Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper addresses this question empirically using primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of collective action clauses increases yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. By implication, the perceived benefits from easier restructuring are at least as large as any costs from increased moral hazard.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Becker, Törbjörn I.
Richards, Anthony J.
Thaicharoen, Yunyong.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1451851596:
9781451851595
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451851595.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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