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Financial Stability and Fiscal Crises in a Monetary Union [electronic resource] Jahjah, Samir.

Author/Creator:
Jahjah, Samir.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 01/201.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 01/201
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (25 p.)
Local subjects:
Budget constraint. (search)
Budget constraints. (search)
Budget deficit. (search)
Budget deficits. (search)
Central bank. (search)
Central Banks and Their Policies. (search)
Debt. (search)
Debt Management. (search)
Debt service. (search)
Determination of Interest Rates. (search)
Domestic debt. (search)
Economic models. (search)
European monetary union. (search)
Excessive deficits. (search)
Financial stability. (search)
Fiscal coordination. (search)
Fiscal costs. (search)
Fiscal crises. (search)
Fiscal crisis. (search)
Fiscal criteria. (search)
Fiscal deficits. (search)
Fiscal discipline. (search)
Fiscal federalism. (search)
Fiscal flows. (search)
Fiscal implication. (search)
Fiscal institutions. (search)
Fiscal mechanism. (search)
Fiscal policies. (search)
Fiscal policy. (search)
Fiscal regime. (search)
Fiscal relations. (search)
Fiscal retrenchment. (search)
Fiscal soundness. (search)
Fiscal theory. (search)
Fiscal transfers. (search)
General. (search)
Government borrowing constraints. (search)
Government budget. (search)
Government budget constraint. (search)
Government expenditures. (search)
Government primary budget deficit. (search)
Government securities. (search)
Inflation. (search)
Intergovernmental fiscal. (search)
Intergovernmental fiscal relations. (search)
International Financial Markets. (search)
International monetary arrangements. (search)
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions. (search)
Level of debt service. (search)
Loose fiscal policies. (search)
Loose monetary policy. (search)
Monetary arrangements. (search)
Monetary base. (search)
Monetary economics. (search)
Monetary fund. (search)
Monetary institution. (search)
Monetary integration. (search)
Monetary policy. (search)
Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects). (search)
Monetary regime. (search)
Monetary regimes. (search)
Monetary unification. (search)
Monetary union. (search)
Monetary unions. (search)
Money demand. (search)
Money supply. (search)
National budget. (search)
Optimal monetary policy. (search)
Primary budget deficit. (search)
Public debt. (search)
Public expenditure. (search)
Public finance. (search)
Tax avoidance. (search)
Tax policy. (search)
Tax revenue. (search)
Tax revenues. (search)
Taxation. (search)
Term Structure of Interest Rates. (search)
Tight monetary policy. (search)
Canada. (search)
Italy. (search)
United States. (search)
Summary:
The main tasks of central banks are to secure price and financial stability. These objectives can, in times of crises, conflict with one another, and the central bank may have to renounce one of them in order to secure the other. In a monetary union, this trade-off can be exacerbated by the presence of highly indebted countries or by the risk of loose fiscal policies. This paper offers a simple theoretical model that captures the trade-off. Different fiscal institutions are compared in order to evaluate their impact on the conduct of monetary policy. More specifically, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth in Europe are analyzed in light of this model. Fiscal mechanisms exist to help prevent or minimize the risk of fiscal crises and the corresponding risk of central bank financing and inflation.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Jahjah, Samir.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1451874359:
9781451874358
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451874358.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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