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Good, Bad or Ugly? [electronic resource] : On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting, Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria.

Author/Creator:
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 00/172.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 00/172
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (26 p.)
Local subjects:
Accounting practices.
Budget balance.
Budget constraint.
Budget deficit.
Budget deficits.
Budget institutions.
Budget position.
Budget rule.
Budget rules.
Budget surplus.
Budget transparency.
Budgetary accounts.
Budgetary institutions.
Budgetary outcomes.
Budgetary policy.
Budgetary position.
Composition of public spending.
Cyclical downturn.
Cyclical downturns.
Cyclical fiscal policy.
Discretionary fiscal policy.
Excessive deficits.
Expenditure policy.
Fiscal adjustment.
Fiscal aggregates.
Fiscal authorities.
Fiscal authority.
Fiscal balance.
Fiscal behavior.
Fiscal constraints.
Fiscal crises.
Fiscal deficit.
Fiscal deficits.
Fiscal discipline.
Fiscal imbalances.
Fiscal outcome.
Fiscal performance.
Fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy decisions.
Fiscal policy rules.
Fiscal policy variables.
Fiscal position.
Fiscal profligacy.
Fiscal restraints.
Fiscal rule.
Fiscal rules.
Fiscal stabilizers.
Fiscal stance.
Fiscal targets.
Fiscal variables.
Formal fiscal restraints.
Government accounting.
Government budget.
Government liabilities.
Government revenue.
Government solvency.
Government spending.
Level of public spending.
National budget.
Public debt.
Public deficits.
Public expenditure.
Public investment.
Public spending.
State budgets.
Structural fiscal.
Tax rates.
Tax revenue.
Taxation.
Transparent budgets.
Italy.
Summary:
Do fiscal rules likely lead to fiscal adjustment, or do they encourage the use of ‘creative accounting’? This question is studied with a model in which fiscal rules are imposed on ‘measured’ fiscal variables, which can differ from ‘true’ variables because there is a margin for creative accounting. The probability of detecting creative accounting depends on its size and the transparency of the budget. The model studies the effects on fiscal policy of different rules, separating structural from cyclical effects, and examines how these effects depend on the underlying fiscal distortion and on the degree of transparency of the budget.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1451858566:
9781451858563
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451858563.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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