Franklin

The Decentralization Dilemma in India [electronic resource] Purfield, Catriona.

Author/Creator:
Purfield, Catriona.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 04/32.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 04/32
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (31 p.)
Local subjects:
Borrowing.
Budget activity.
Budget constraint.
Budget constraints.
Budget deficit.
Budget implementation.
Budget institutions.
Budget rule.
Central government deficit.
Central government expenditure.
Contingent liabilities.
Debt burden.
Debt service.
Decentralization.
Expenditure ratio.
Fiscal activities.
Fiscal activity.
Fiscal adjustment.
Fiscal behavior.
Fiscal decentralization.
Fiscal deficit.
Fiscal deficits.
Fiscal discipline.
Fiscal federalism.
Fiscal imbalance.
Fiscal imbalances.
Fiscal indicators.
Fiscal indiscipline.
Fiscal performance.
Fiscal policy.
Fiscal position.
Fiscal problem.
Fiscal problems.
Fiscal reform.
Fiscal reforms.
Fiscal relations.
Fiscal responsibility.
Fiscal risk.
Fiscal situation.
Fiscal stress.
Fiscal system.
General government expenditure.
Government deficit.
Government expenditure.
Government finances.
Government grants.
Government guarantees.
Government loans.
Government policy.
Government revenue.
Government spending.
Governmental fiscal relations.
High spending.
Interest expenditure.
Intergovernmental fiscal.
Intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Level of indebtedness.
Primary deficit.
State budgets.
Tax base.
Tax bases.
Tax collection.
Tax collections.
Tax effort.
Tax incentives.
Tax revenue.
Tax share.
India.
Summary:
Already in precarious shape, the financial health of India’s states took a turn for the worse in the late 1990s when state deficits and debt rose sharply. While India is among the world’s most decentralized economies, greater decentralization is not the root cause of this situation. Panel estimation techniques find evidence that the trend rise in deficits reflects problems of transfer dependence and moral hazard that undermine states’ incentives to control deficits. Those states that rely more on central government transfers and have easier borrowing access run higher deficits.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Purfield, Catriona.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
1451845146:
9781451845143
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451845143.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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