Franklin

Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets [electronic resource] Bolt, Wilko.

Author/Creator:
Bolt, Wilko.
Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005.
Series:
IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 05/194.
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper No. 05/194
Format/Description:
Government document
Book
1 online resource (14 p.)
Local subjects:
Banks.
Credit.
Demand functions.
Density function.
Economic models.
General.
Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices.
Monopolization.
Mortgages.
Other Depository Institutions.
Payment system.
Payment systems.
Payments.
Price structures.
Prices.
Pricing.
Social welfare.
Welfare function.
France.
Summary:
Using a simple model of two-sided markets, we show that, in the social optimum, platform pricing leads to an inherent cost recovery problem. This result is driven by the positive externality of participation that users on either side of the market exert on the opposite side. The contribution of this positive externality to social welfare leads the social planner to increase users'' participation by setting prices at both sides of the market such that the total price is below marginal cost. This causes operational losses for the platform. Our result holds for both interior pricing and skewed pricing in two-sided markets.
Notes:
Description based on print version record.
Contributor:
Bolt, Wilko.
Tieman, Alexander F.
Other format:
Print Version:
ISBN:
145186213X:
9781451862133
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher Number:
10.5089/9781451862133.001
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.
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