Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? : The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation / Jean-Charles Rochet.
- Other records:
- Course Book
- Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 
1 online resource (320 p.)
- Lenders of last resort.
Banks and banking -- State supervision.
Bank failures -- Government policy.
- Electronic books.
- Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.
Preface and Acknowledgments
General Introduction and Outline of the Book
PART 1. Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?
Chapter One. Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? / Rochet, Jean-Charles
PART 2. The Lender of Last Resort
Chapter Two. Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? / Rochet, Jean-Charles / Vives, Xavier
Chapter Three. The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach / Freixas, Xavier / Parigi, Bruno M. / Rochet, Jean-Charles
PART 3. Prudential Regulation and the Management of Systemic Risk
Chapter Four. Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision / Rochet, Jean-Charles
Chapter Five. Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk / Rochet, Jean-Charles / Tirole, Jean
Chapter Six Controlling Risk in Payment Systems / Rochet, Jean-Charles / Tirole, Jean
Chapter Seven. Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank / Freixas, Xavier / Parigi, Bruno M. / Rochet, Jean-Charles
PART 4 Solvency Regulations
Chapter Eight. Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks / Rochet, Jean-Charles
Chapter Nine. Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II / Rochet, Jean-Charles
Chapter Ten. The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix / Décamps, Jean-Paul / Rochet, Jean-Charles / Roger, Benoît
- Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)
- Publisher Number:
- 10.1515/9781400828319 doi
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