Franklin

Personal agency [electronic resource] : the metaphysics of mind and action / E.J. Lowe.

Author/Creator:
Lowe, E. J. (E. Jonathan)
Publication:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008.
Format/Description:
Book
1 online resource (241 p.)
Subjects:
Agent (Philosophy)
Choice (Psychology)
Free will and determinism.
Form/Genre:
Electronic books.
Language:
English
Summary:
E.J. Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will.
Contents:
""Contents""; ""List of Figures""; ""Introduction""; ""1. Some questions and answers""; ""2. Event causation and agent causation""; ""3. Free action and causation""; ""4. Reasons and causes""; ""5. An interim summing up""; ""6. The challenge of�and to�physicalism""; ""7. A brief look ahead""; ""Part I. Mental Causation, Causal Closure, and Emergent Dualism""; ""1. Self, Agency, and Mental Causation""; ""1.1. An apparently inconsistent triad""; ""1.2. The self is not its body""; ""1.3. Mental states are not physical states""; ""1.4. Selfhood requires agency""
""1.5. Are the three claims inconsistent?""""1.6. Naturalistic dualism is possible""; ""1.7. On coincidental events""; ""1.8. A comparison between two possible worlds""; ""1.9. The significance of these findings""; ""1.10. Intentionality and mental causation""; ""1.11. An illustrative example""; ""1.12. An objection and a reply""; ""2. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism""; ""2.1. Causal closure arguments for physicalism""; ""2.2. The surprising variety of causal closure principles""; ""2.3. Some causal closure principles that we may justifiably ignore""
""2.4. A causal closure principle that is manifestly too weak""""2.5. A stronger causal closure principle that avoids the transitivity problem""; ""2.6. Weak causal closure and non-coincidence through mental causation""; ""2.7. The consistency of strong causal closure with dualistic interactionism""; ""2.8. What can we reasonably demand of a model of mental causation?""; ""3. Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation""; ""3.1. The early modern roots of the debate over interactive dualism""; ""3.2. The contemporary debate and the appeal to causal closure""
""3.3. Is the causal closure principle (CCP) true?""""3.4. Is the non-overdetermination principle (NOP) true?""; ""3.5. The invisibility of mental causation""; ""3.6. Objections, replies, and some philosophical lessons to be learnt""; ""4. Could Volitions Be Epiphenomenal?""; ""4.1. Concerning epiphenomenalism""; ""4.2. Volitions and volitionism""; ""4.3. Automatisms and illusions of control""; ""4.4. Libet on the unconscious cerebral initiation of voluntary actions""; ""4.5. Can the causal efficacy of the will coherently be doubted?""
""4.6. How is causal knowledge of the physical world possible?""""4.7. The incoherence of full-blown epiphenomenalism""; ""5. The Self as an Emergent Substance""; ""5.1. Non-Cartesian substance dualism defined""; ""5.2. The unity argument for NCSD""; ""5.3. The causal closure argument against interactive dualism""; ""5.4. Two different perspectives on the causal explanation of voluntary action""; ""5.5. A counterfactual-based argument against psychoneural identity theories""; ""5.6. Extending the argument to �realization� accounts""
""5.7. Intentional causation versus physical causation""
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [213]-218) and indexes.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
0-19-959250-0
1-281-85256-2
9786611852566
0-19-155090-6
OCLC:
302343890
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