In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space thatis epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of pr
Contents Introduction 1. Testimonial Injustice 1.1 Power 1.2 Identity Power 1.3 The Central Case of Testimonial Injustice 2. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy 2.1 Stereotypes and Prejudicial Stereotypes 2.2 Testimonial Injustice without Prejudice? 2.3 The Wrong of Testimonial Injustice 3. Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony 3.1 Sketching the Dialectical Position 3.2 The Responsible Hearer? 3.3 Virtuous Perception: Moral and Epistemic; 3.4 Tr ining Saensibility; 4. The Virtue of Testimonial Justice; 4.1 Correcting for Prejudice 4.2 History, Blame, and Moral Disappointment 5. The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice 5.1 A Third Fundamental Virtue of Truth 5.2 A Hybrid Virtue: Intellectual-Ethical 6. Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited 6.1 Two Kinds of Silence 6.2 The Very Idea of a Knower 7. Hermeneutical Injustice 7.1 The Central Case of Hermeneutical Injustice 7.2 Hermeneutical Marginalization 7.3 The Wrong of Hermeneutical Injustice 7.4 The Virtue of Hermeneutical Justice Conclusion Bibliography Index A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; V; W; Y; Z
Description based upon print version of record. Includes bibliographical references (pages -184) and index. Description based on print version record.