Bank Lobbying [electronic resource] : Regulatory Capture and Beyond / Deniz O Igan.

Author/Creator:

Igan, Deniz O.

Publication:

Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2018.

Series:

IMF eLibrary
IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers

Format/Description:

Government document
Book
1 online resource (30 pages)

Summary:

In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks. Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions as well as strenghtened checks and balances within the decision-making process would go in this direction.

Notes:

Part of the IMF eLibrary collection.
Description based on print version record.

Contributor:

Lambert, Thomas.

Other format:

Print Version: Igan, Deniz O. Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond

ISBN:

9781484347546

ISSN:

1018-5941

Publisher Number:

10.5089/9781484347546.001

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.

Online:

Connect to full text
http://hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017.12/2298114

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