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Strategies of Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights [electronic resource] : Rational Choice Within Normative Constraints / Andreas von Staden.

Author/Creator:
von Staden, Andreas, author.
Publication:
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, [2018]
Format/Description:
Book
1 online resource : 3 illustrations.
Series:
Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights
Contained In:
De Gruyter University Press Library.
Status/Location:
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Details

Subjects:
Compliance.
Effectiveness and validity of law -- European Union countries.
Human rights -- Government policy -- Germany.
Human rights -- Government policy -- Great Britain.
Local subjects:
Human Rights. (search)
Law. (search)
Political Science. (search)
Public Policy. (search)
Language:
In English.
System Details:
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
text file PDF
Summary:
In Strategies of Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights, Andreas von Staden looks at the nature of human rights challenges in two enduring liberal democracies-Germany and the United Kingdom. Employing an ambitious data set that covers the compliance status of all European Court of Human Rights judgments rendered until 2015, von Staden presents a cross-national overview of compliance that illustrates a strong correlation between the quality of a country's democracy and the rate at which judgments have met compliance. Tracing the impact of violations in Germany and the United Kingdom specifically, he details how governments, legislators, and domestic judges responded to the court's demands for either financial compensation or changes to laws, policies, and practices.Framing his analysis in the context of the long-standing international relations debate between rationalists who argue that actions are dictated by an actor's preferences and cost-benefit calculations, and constructivists, who emphasize the influence of norms on behavior, von Staden argues that the question of whether to comply with a judgment needs to be analyzed separately from the question of how to comply. According to von Staden, constructivist reasoning best explains why Germany and the United Kingdom are motivated to comply with the European Court of Human Rights judgments, while rationalist reasoning in most cases accounts for how these countries bring their laws, policies, and practices into sufficient compliance for their cases to be closed. When complying with adverse decisions while also exploiting all available options to minimize their domestic impact, liberal democracies are thus both norm-abiding and rational-instrumentalist at the same time-in other words, they choose their compliance strategies rationally within the normative constraint of having to comply with the Court's judgments.
Contents:
Frontmatter
CONTENTS
Introduction. The Convention, the Court, and Second-Order Compliance
Chapter 1. Compliance Theory: Rational Choice Within Normative Constraints
PART I. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Chapter 2. The Uneasy Place of the ECHR and ECtHR in UK Law and Politics
Chapter 3. Compliance with Just Satisfaction Awards and Individual Measures
Chapter 4. Compliance with General Measures I: Sociopolitical Issues
Chapter 5. Compliance with General Measures II: Security, Crime, and Justice
Chapter 6. Judgments Pending Before the Committee of Ministers
Chapter 7. Minimalism as the Strategy of Choice for the Reluctant Complier
PART II. GERMANY
Chapter 8. The Convention and Court Within Constitutionalized Rights Protection
Chapter 9. Compliance with Just Satisfaction Awards and Individual Measures
Chapter 10. Compliance with General Measures
Chapter 11. Exploiting Choice Within a Domestic Human Rights Culture
Conclusion. Human Rights Compliance as Normatively Constrained Rational Choice
Appendix. Further Judgments Against the United Kingdom
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Notes:
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Nov 2018)
ISBN:
9780812295153
Publisher Number:
10.9783/9780812295153 doi
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.