From utterances to speech acts [electronic resource] / Mikhail Kissine.
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
1 online resource (210 p.)
- Speech acts (Linguistics).
- Electronic books.
- This is naturalistic theory of when, how and why our utterances are interpreted as speech acts: assertions, orders or promises.
- Contents; Figures; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Introduction; 0.1 Motivation; 0.2 Conventional and non-conventional speech acts; 0.3 The two main ingredients of the account; 0.4 Outline of the book; 1 Austins distinctions revisited; 1.1 Austins levels of meaning and Davidsons philosophy of action; 1.2 Perlocutionary acts and causal effects; 1.3 From phatic to locutionary acts; 1.3.1 Phatic acts and semantic contents; 1.3.2 Austin on rhetic and locutionary acts; 1.3.3 Locutionary acts and propositional content; 1.4 Locutionary acts and expressions of Intentional states; 1.5 Conclusion
2 Intentional states and locutionary acts2.1 Direction of fit; 2.2 De re and de dicto; 2.3 Potentiality and Intentional states; 2.4 Intentions; 2.5 Potentiality in language; 2.5.1 Updating information states; 2.5.2 A short excursus on epistemic possibility; 2.5.3 Potentiality: a property of locutionary acts; 2.5.4 Precautionary notes; 2.6 Functions in language and mind; 2.6.1 Functions: direct and derived; 2.6.2 Functions and context; 2.6.3 Locutionary and illocutionary functions; 2.7 Functional isomorphism between locutionary acts and Intentional states; 2.8 Conclusion
3 Constative speech acts3.1 Influencing the addressees beliefs; 3.2 Constative speech acts as reasons to believe; 3.3 When the constative force is missing; 3.3.1 Irony; 3.3.2 Platitudes; 3.3.3 Soliloquies; 3.4 The function of constative illocutionary acts; 3.5 The contents of constative illocutionary acts; 3.5.1 Direct versus indirect; 3.5.2 Commitment to the performance versus commitment to the content; 3.6 Trust and communication; 3.7 The origins of truth-commitment; 3.8 Assertions and commitment; 3.9 Presupposition accommodation; 3.10 Conclusion; 4 Directive speech acts
4.1 Against perlocutionary accounts: again4.2 Directive speech acts as reasons to act; 4.3 Directive speech acts, potentiality and possibility; 4.4 Desirability; 4.5 Indirect versus secondary directive speech acts; 4.5.1 Sentence-types and illocutionary forces; 4.5.2 Primary and indirect speech acts; 4.6 When the directive force is missing; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Speech acts, autism spectrum disorders and typical development; 5.1 Autism spectrum disorders: pragmatics and mindreading; 5.2 Varieties of false-belief tasks; 5.3 False-belief tasks and cognitive flexibility
5.4 Perspective-shifting: immature versus impaired5.4.1 Implicit belief attribution; 5.4.2 Counterfactual reasoning; 5.4.3 Pretence; 5.4.4 Joint attention; 5.5 Perspective-shifting and communication; 5.5.1 Constative speech acts; 5.5.2 Directive speech acts; 5.6 Pragmatics in ASDs; 5.7 Conclusion; 6 Commissive speech acts; 6.1 Conventions and promises; 6.2 A semantic solution?; 6.3 Explaining the commitment; 6.3.1 Commissives versus first-person directives; 6.3.2 Expression of intentions; 6.3.3 Predictions and expression of intentions; 6.3.4 Commitment; 6.4 Threats
6.5 Cognitive underpinnings of commissives
- Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
|Location||Notes||Your Loan Policy|
|Description||Status||Barcode||Your Loan Policy|