Between Impunity and Imperialism: The Regulation of Transnational Bribery describes the legal regime that regulates transnational bribery, identifies and explains the rationales that have guided its evolution, and suggests directions for reform. The broad argument is that the current regime embodies a set of values, theories, and practices labeled the "OECD paradigm." A key premise is that transnational bribery is a serious problem which merits a vigorous legal response, particularly given the difficulty of detecting instances of bribery. The shape of the appropriate response can be summed up in the phrase, "every little bit helps." In practice this means that: prohibitions should capture a broad range of conduct; enforcement should target as broad a range of actors as possible; sanctions should be as stiff as possible; and as many enforcement agencies as possible should be involved in the enforcement process. The OECD paradigm embraces two interrelated propositions: that transnational bribery is a serious problem and that it demands a uniform response. An important challenge to the OECD paradigm, labeled the "anti-imperialist critique," accepts that transnational bribery is a serious problem but denies that the appropriate legal responses must be uniform. This book explores both the OECD paradigm and the anti-imperialist critique, and provides a detailed analysis of their implications for the key elements of transnational bribery law. It concludes by suggesting that the competing views can be reconciled by moving toward a more inclusive and experimentalist regime which accommodates reasonable disagreements about regulatory design and is crafted with due attention to the interests of all affected parties.
Introduction Imperial anti-corruption law The birth of modern transnational bribery law The modern regime Criteria for evaluation What is bribery? Prohibitions that extend beyond bribery When should organizations be liable for foreign bribery? How should transnational bribery law be enforced? How should responsibility for regulation be allocated? Concluding thoughts.