Franklin

Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War.

Author/Creator:
Harvey, Frank P.
Publication:
Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994.
Format/Description:
Book
1 online resource (209 pages)
Status/Location:
Loading...

Options
Location Notes Your Loan Policy

Details

Other records:
Subjects:
Deterrence (Strategy).
Nuclear warfare.
World politics -- 1989-.
Form/Genre:
Electronic books.
Summary:
Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.
Contents:
Intro
Contents
Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions
2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing
3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing
4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88
5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence
6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War
7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War
Notes
Bibliography
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
R
S
T
V
W
Y
Z.
Notes:
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Local notes:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2021. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Other format:
Print version: Harvey, Frank P. Future's Back
ISBN:
9780773566569
9780773516052
OCLC:
929121262