Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.
Intro Contents Tables and Figures Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions 2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing 3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing 4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence 6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War 7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War Notes Bibliography Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T V W Y Z.
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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2021. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.