Being Human in Safety-Critical Organisations.

Gregory, Dik.
London : The Stationery Office Ltd, 2017.
1 online resource (292 pages)

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Industrial safety.
Electronic books.
This title presents an integrated model of human behaviour at work, relevant to a maritime context, and a description of the many sources of influences on this behaviour, with examples and suggestions (particularly relevant to the maritime sector) about how these influences can be brought under better control - by both individuals and organisations - resulting in safer, more effective work.
Being Human in safety-critical organisations
List of figures
List of tables
Preface - Gretchen Haskins
Foreword - Sir Alan Massey
Foreword - Chris Bailey
Foreword - John Adams
Foreword - Capt. Yves Vandenborn
1 About this book: how people create safety, what stops them and what to do about it
Being human
A new perspective
A new framework
2 Being at work: the curiousness of the problems we really face
The puzzle of people
What do humans actually do?
Speedbird 38 - plucked from the jaws of disaster by human agency
What was good here?
Unintended consequences - what happens when youpoke a system with a stick
The curiousness of the problems we really face
3 Being framed: how context makes us blind
A question of perspective
Hiding in plain sight
A nasty surprise
The day attention ran out on Emilia Theresa
Attention can become too much of a good thing
Isn't this just complacency?
A tale of two cities
The impossibility of a single, objective context
The power of shared context
The generation of context
Figure 3.1 The three main ingredients in our creation of context
How is the SUGAR model used in this book?
4 Being sufficient: how much is enough?
Absolute must or relative need?
Natural sufficiency
Everyday behaviour
"Safety is paramount"
Erik Hollnagel's efficiency-thoroughness trade-off
Table 4.1 ETTO rules
Figure 4.1 The SUGAR model
The Herald of Free Enterprise catastrophe
The ship and crew that day
The company
Table 4.2 Herald of Free Enterprise: investigation highlights and possible SUGAR influences
A spoonful of SUGAR
Figure 4.2 The traditional view of the contribution of human factors
Figure 4.3 A more comprehensive view of the contribution of human factors.
5 Being in a state: what does our state do to our sense of safety?
Fitness for work
Tiredness and accidents
How does fatigue arise?
How does fatigue affect us at work?
What is stress?
What does stress do to people?
How does stress work?
The relationship between stress and complex system operations
Boredom and complacency
Why is boredom boring?
Figure 5.1 The Yerkes-Dodson inverted U curve
What is complacency?
Failure to see the problem
Failure to act on the problem
Positive states, performance and safety
6 Being in the know - part I: how our senses deceive us
What is it to know something?
Our senses
The sky is blue - isn't it?
Seeing things that aren't there
You must be hearing things
What you see depends on who you are
Figure 6.1 How to see your own blind spot
We expect a 3D world
Figure 6.2 Conflicting expectations
Figure 6.3 The eyes don't have it
All our senses are in on it
Imperfect channels
7 Being in the know - part II: where meaning comes from
Sense-making is construction, not reflection
Is that why we can't know everything?
Where does emotion fit in?
The curious case of Phineas Gage
Thinking fast and thinking slow
When System 1 dominates
USS Vincennes - when worlds collide
Different understanding, different response121314
What does memory actually remember?
Cognitive biases - mechanisms for greater efficiency
Figure 7.1 Letters
Figure 7.2 Numbers
A tragic System 1 miscategorisation
The curious problem of attention
The grounding of Royal Majesty - a case of misplaced attention
Figure 7.3 Actual and plotted courses of Royal Majesty
8 Being in the know - part III: why do we do risky things?
Risky business
Perceiving risk
Why is it difficult to understand probability?.
Why are consequences difficult to see?
Why do consequences surprise us as individuals?
Bad calibrations
Losing control to motorway madness
The catastrophic value of punctuality
Hoegh Osaka - when familiarity breeds disaster
So, what do we know about risk perception?
Perceived control
Perceived value
Perceived familiarity
Biases are sensitive to context
Why do consequences surprise systems?
9 Being in the know - part IV: how hindsight deceives us
Seeing with hindsight
The second-to-worst thing that can happen
The tragic story of Concorde, Air France 4590
An evolutionary perspective
10 Being on target: managing purposes, procrastination, plans and practice
Goals in the SUGAR model
What gets you out of bed?
What is motivation?
Where does motivation come from?
Deeper levels of motivation
Motivational issues in high-risk environments
The conflict between efficiency and thoroughness
Other motivational conflicts
Motivation and values
Willpower and self-control
Plans, goals and priorities
Stages on the road to expertise
Novice - student
Advanced beginner - new graduate
Competence - one to two years in practice
How do you become an expert?
11 Being together: good teams, wicked groups and the need for diversity
Why does teamwork matter?
Two examples of good teamwork
Good teamwork prevents a VLCC from grounding
Good teamwork aboard United Airlines flight 232
Bad teamwork aboard USS Vincennes
Figure 11.1 The team as a network of dynamic relationships
Ten ways good teams create safety
A word of caution
Taskwork training versus teamwork training
How our social nature can create threats
Compliance with group norms and organisational drift.
The bystander effect
In-groups versus out-groups
Diversity is not a political aspiration - it's a practical need
A double-edged sword
Cultural diversity and culture shock
Table 11.1 Hofstede's value dimensions
Cultural variation in the workplace
Table 11.2 Examples of different cultural preferences in the workplace
The problem with diversity
The need for diversity
Managing diversity
Leadership and safety
The magic and mystery of social capital
Social capital and teams
Social capital and trust
12 Being human: how organisations get the opposite of what they want
Mere complication
The nature of complexity
Why do we favour efficiency over thoroughness?
The 'brakes' of thoroughness, why they fail and how to understand it when they do
A 'just' culture is a means - not an end
What is 'accountability', how is it different from 'responsibility' and how can it be made fair?
Why do organisations need to care about these qualities?
What is resilience?
Table 12.1 Ways in which complex systems are vulnerable
Measuring resilience
Two views of safety
The real source of safety
13 Being practical - part I: how can you increase your own resilience?
About this chapter
Do you have trouble with tiredness?
Table 13.1 Fatigue questionnaire
Assessing your tiredness
Dealing with fatigue
Dealing with stress
Your experience with stress
Table 13.2 Stress questionnaire
How to prepare for stress
What to do when disaster strikes
Dealing with complacency
Dealing with boredom
Dealing with risk
Dealing with your unconscious biases
Dealing with motivation
Table 13.3 Are you in the right job?
Table 13.4 How could your job become more motivating?
Dealing with your seniors
Dealing with difficult people and difficult conversations.
Difficult people
Difficult conversations
Dealing with teamwork
Table 13.5 How could you improve your team skills?
Table 13.6 How could your team do better?
14 Being practical - part II: how can you increase your organisation's resilience?
About this chapter
Dealing with fatigue
Dealing with stress
Reducing stress in the workplace
Designing for resilience
Selecting for resilience
Training for resilience
Additional benefits of training to cope with pressure
Dealing with motivation
Dealing in social capital
Dealing with complacency
Dealing with boredom
Dealing with incidents
Mindset Analysis
Dealing with prevention
Safety indicators
Resilience indicators in action - the Teekay initiative
Detecting resonance with FRAM
Figure 14.1 Structure of a function in a FRAM model
Creating a strategy for organisational resilience
The need for a unifying strategy
1 - A systems approach
2 - An organic approach
Figure 14.2 An organic approach to developing a safety culture based on resilience
3 - A performance approach
Figure 14.3 HeliOffshore Safety Performance Model (top level)
Safety enablers - the potential for 'big data'
SUGAR ingredients
Last word
15 References
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Local notes:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2021. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Shanahan, Paul.
Other format:
Print version: Gregory, Dik Being Human in Safety-Critical Organisations