This title presents an integrated model of human behaviour at work, relevant to a maritime context, and a description of the many sources of influences on this behaviour, with examples and suggestions (particularly relevant to the maritime sector) about how these influences can be brought under better control - by both individuals and organisations - resulting in safer, more effective work.
Being Human in safety-critical organisations Contents List of figures List of tables Preface - Gretchen Haskins Foreword - Sir Alan Massey Foreword - Chris Bailey Foreword - John Adams Foreword - Capt. Yves Vandenborn Acknowledgements 1 About this book: how people create safety, what stops them and what to do about it Being human A new perspective A new framework 2 Being at work: the curiousness of the problems we really face The puzzle of people What do humans actually do? Speedbird 38 - plucked from the jaws of disaster by human agency What was good here? Unintended consequences - what happens when youpoke a system with a stick The curiousness of the problems we really face 3 Being framed: how context makes us blind A question of perspective Hiding in plain sight A nasty surprise The day attention ran out on Emilia Theresa Attention can become too much of a good thing Isn't this just complacency? A tale of two cities The impossibility of a single, objective context The power of shared context The generation of context Figure 3.1 The three main ingredients in our creation of context How is the SUGAR model used in this book? 4 Being sufficient: how much is enough? Absolute must or relative need? Natural sufficiency Everyday behaviour "Safety is paramount" Erik Hollnagel's efficiency-thoroughness trade-off Table 4.1 ETTO rules Figure 4.1 The SUGAR model The Herald of Free Enterprise catastrophe The ship and crew that day The company Table 4.2 Herald of Free Enterprise: investigation highlights and possible SUGAR influences A spoonful of SUGAR Figure 4.2 The traditional view of the contribution of human factors Figure 4.3 A more comprehensive view of the contribution of human factors. 5 Being in a state: what does our state do to our sense of safety? Fitness for work Fatigue Tiredness and accidents How does fatigue arise? How does fatigue affect us at work? Stress What is stress? What does stress do to people? How does stress work? The relationship between stress and complex system operations Boredom and complacency Why is boredom boring? Figure 5.1 The Yerkes-Dodson inverted U curve What is complacency? Failure to see the problem Failure to act on the problem Positive states, performance and safety 6 Being in the know - part I: how our senses deceive us What is it to know something? Our senses The sky is blue - isn't it? Seeing things that aren't there You must be hearing things What you see depends on who you are Figure 6.1 How to see your own blind spot We expect a 3D world Figure 6.2 Conflicting expectations Figure 6.3 The eyes don't have it All our senses are in on it Imperfect channels 7 Being in the know - part II: where meaning comes from Sense-making is construction, not reflection Is that why we can't know everything? Where does emotion fit in? The curious case of Phineas Gage Thinking fast and thinking slow When System 1 dominates USS Vincennes - when worlds collide Different understanding, different response121314 What does memory actually remember? Cognitive biases - mechanisms for greater efficiency Figure 7.1 Letters Figure 7.2 Numbers A tragic System 1 miscategorisation The curious problem of attention The grounding of Royal Majesty - a case of misplaced attention Figure 7.3 Actual and plotted courses of Royal Majesty 8 Being in the know - part III: why do we do risky things? Risky business Perceiving risk Why is it difficult to understand probability?. Why are consequences difficult to see? Why do consequences surprise us as individuals? Bad calibrations Losing control to motorway madness The catastrophic value of punctuality Hoegh Osaka - when familiarity breeds disaster So, what do we know about risk perception? Perceived control Perceived value Perceived familiarity Biases are sensitive to context Why do consequences surprise systems? 9 Being in the know - part IV: how hindsight deceives us Seeing with hindsight The second-to-worst thing that can happen The tragic story of Concorde, Air France 4590 An evolutionary perspective 10 Being on target: managing purposes, procrastination, plans and practice Goals in the SUGAR model What gets you out of bed? What is motivation? Where does motivation come from? Deeper levels of motivation Motivational issues in high-risk environments The conflict between efficiency and thoroughness Other motivational conflicts Motivation and values Procrastination Impulses Habits Willpower and self-control Plans, goals and priorities Self-awareness Stages on the road to expertise Novice - student Advanced beginner - new graduate Competence - one to two years in practice Proficiency Expert How do you become an expert? 11 Being together: good teams, wicked groups and the need for diversity Why does teamwork matter? Two examples of good teamwork Good teamwork prevents a VLCC from grounding Good teamwork aboard United Airlines flight 232 Bad teamwork aboard USS Vincennes Figure 11.1 The team as a network of dynamic relationships Ten ways good teams create safety A word of caution Taskwork training versus teamwork training How our social nature can create threats Compliance with group norms and organisational drift. The bystander effect Groupthink In-groups versus out-groups Diversity is not a political aspiration - it's a practical need A double-edged sword Cultural diversity and culture shock Table 11.1 Hofstede's value dimensions Cultural variation in the workplace Table 11.2 Examples of different cultural preferences in the workplace The problem with diversity The need for diversity Managing diversity Leadership and safety The magic and mystery of social capital Social capital and teams Social capital and trust 12 Being human: how organisations get the opposite of what they want Mere complication The nature of complexity Why do we favour efficiency over thoroughness? The 'brakes' of thoroughness, why they fail and how to understand it when they do A 'just' culture is a means - not an end What is 'accountability', how is it different from 'responsibility' and how can it be made fair? Why do organisations need to care about these qualities? What is resilience? Table 12.1 Ways in which complex systems are vulnerable Measuring resilience Two views of safety The real source of safety 13 Being practical - part I: how can you increase your own resilience? About this chapter Do you have trouble with tiredness? Table 13.1 Fatigue questionnaire Assessing your tiredness Dealing with fatigue Dealing with stress Your experience with stress Table 13.2 Stress questionnaire How to prepare for stress What to do when disaster strikes Dealing with complacency Dealing with boredom Dealing with risk Dealing with your unconscious biases Dealing with motivation Table 13.3 Are you in the right job? Table 13.4 How could your job become more motivating? Dealing with your seniors Dealing with difficult people and difficult conversations. Difficult people Difficult conversations Dealing with teamwork Table 13.5 How could you improve your team skills? Table 13.6 How could your team do better? 14 Being practical - part II: how can you increase your organisation's resilience? About this chapter Dealing with fatigue Dealing with stress Reducing stress in the workplace Designing for resilience Selecting for resilience Training for resilience Additional benefits of training to cope with pressure Dealing with motivation Dealing in social capital Dealing with complacency Dealing with boredom Dealing with incidents Mindset Analysis Dealing with prevention Safety indicators Resilience indicators in action - the Teekay initiative Detecting resonance with FRAM Figure 14.1 Structure of a function in a FRAM model Creating a strategy for organisational resilience The need for a unifying strategy 1 - A systems approach 2 - An organic approach Figure 14.2 An organic approach to developing a safety culture based on resilience 3 - A performance approach Figure 14.3 HeliOffshore Safety Performance Model (top level) Safety enablers - the potential for 'big data' SUGAR ingredients Last word 15 References Index.
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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2021. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.