The Strategic Constitution / Robert D. Cooter.
- Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 
1 online resource : 21 tables, 63 line illustrations.
- Constitutional law -- Philosophy.
Law and economics.
- Local subjects:
- Jim Crow laws. (search)
Pareto frontier. (search)
accountability: of legislators. (search)
agenda setting rules. (search)
bargaining, legislative. (search)
chaos theorem. (search)
commodity, contingent. (search)
condemnation doctrine. (search)
delegation game. (search)
discussion set. (search)
emergency doctrine. (search)
engorgement principle. (search)
hate speech. (search)
judicial review. (search)
law merchant. (search)
matching grants. (search)
natural monopoly. (search)
patronage system. (search)
political speech. (search)
private bads. (search)
sub-majority rule. (search)
term limits. (search)
white flight. (search)
zero-sum game. (search)
- In English.
- System Details:
- Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
text file PDF
- Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
LIST OF TABLES
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CHAPTER 1. Taking Consequences Seriously: Introduction
CHAPTER 2. Voting
CHAPTER 3. Bargaining
CHAPTER 4. Administering
CHAPTER 5. Intergovernmental Relations
CHAPTER 6. Government Competition
CHAPTER 7. Ministries and Agencies
CHAPTER 8. Specialization
CHAPTER 9. Separation of Powers
CHAPTER 10. The Value of Rights
CHAPTER 11. Philosophies of Rights: Liberty and Redistribution
CHAPTER 12. Property Rights
CHAPTER 13. Free Speech
CHAPTER 14. Civil Rights
CHAPTER 15. Summary and Conclusion
INDEX OF NAMES
- Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Aug 2020)
- De Gruyter.
- Contained In:
- De Gruyter University Press Library.
- Publisher Number:
- 10.1515/9780691214504 doi
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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